THE IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS

Lecturer DANIEL ENE, PhD.
Bioterra University of Bucharest, (Romania)
daniel.ene.personal@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0009-0001-8660-1979

DOI: 10.51865/JOLAS.2026.25.06

Abstract:
This study examines the impact of artificial intelligence on the organization and functioning of organized criminal groups, starting from the premise that AI is not merely a technological tool for committing crimes, but also a factor driving the structural transformation of organized crime. The research highlights that AI resources increase the efficiency, scalability, and adaptability of illicit activities, while simultaneously lowering barriers to entry and reducing dependence on specialized technical expertise.
The analysis argues that the essential impact of AI manifests itself at the organizational level, through the erosion of traditional hierarchical models and the emergence of flexible, distributed, modular, or weakly formalized forms of organization. Consequently, the organized criminal group tends to be understood less as a stable and formalized structure and increasingly as a dynamic set of functional relationships configured around common criminal objectives.
From a criminal law perspective, the study shows that the use of AI does not, in principle, require a radical reform of the normative framework, but rather calls for an evolutionary interpretation of concepts such as "structure," "coordination," and "continuity." At the same time, the paper highlights difficulties relating to the delimitation of criminal participation, the establishment of causation, the attribution of criminal results, and the administration of digital evidence.
The study concludes that artificial intelligence places significant conceptual and practical pressure on criminal law and, with regard to organized criminal groups, compels it to move from a static approach toward a functional one, adapted to the fluid and technology-driven forms of contemporary criminality.
Keywords: *artificial intelligence; organized crime; organized criminal group; criminal liability; Artificial Intelligence Act; AI Act.*

1. Introduction

The accelerated transformations generated by digitalization, coupled with the increasingly widespread accessibility of artificial intelligence technologies, mark a new stage in the evolution of criminal phenomena. Whereas, traditionally, the analysis of organized crime has focused on the existence of a group (composed of at least three persons), hierarchical structure, coordination, purpose, and stability of criminal organizations [1], [2], contemporary reality reveals a profound tendency toward the reconfiguration of these defining elements under the influence of new technological tools.

In this context, artificial intelligence can no longer be regarded exclusively as a mere technical means of committing crimes, but rather as a factor capable of altering the very logic underlying the organization and functioning of criminal groups.

The relevance of this topic lies in the dynamic evolution of criminal activity and its adaptation to these new techno-scientific realities, as documented in the analyses conducted by institutions responsible for combating organized crime, namely Europol [3], [4], [5], [6] and INTERPOL [7]. These reports highlight the increasingly prominent role of emerging technologies in facilitating and amplifying illicit activities, extending beyond the mere automation of complex processes, enhanced operational efficiency, and rapid adaptation to preventive and enforcement measures adopted by public authorities, to include the reconfiguration of the organizational structure and operational functioning of organized criminal groups.

Accordingly, the present study seeks to clarify whether the use of artificial intelligence resources influences the internal structure and dynamics of organized criminal groups or, in other words, whether such influence is limited to intensifying the efficiency of criminal activities or instead entails a qualitative transformation of the organizational model specific to these entities.

The working hypothesis is based on the premises outlined in the EU SOCTA 2025 Report - *"The changing DNA of serious and organised crime"* [6], according to which AI-based technologies provide criminal groups with substantially expanded capabilities, enabling them to operate on a global scale, increase efficiency, and enhance adaptability. In this context, organized crime is becoming increasingly technologized, flexible, and difficult to detect and combat, leading to the conclusion that artificial intelligence fundamentally reshapes the landscape of organized crime, with criminal groups evolving toward network-type structures characterized by a global, digital, and adaptive profile.

Building upon these findings, the present study argues that the impact of artificial intelligence extends beyond the strictly operational sphere, generating structural effects on the organization of criminal groups. Thus, the use of AI contributes to the erosion of traditional hierarchical structures and encourages the emergence of more fluid organizational forms, based on ad hoc collaborations, distributed functions, and reduced

dependence on centralized coordination, resembling, in certain respects, the organizational model of terrorist networks.

The research methodology is predominantly legal in nature, relying on a normative analysis of the relevant criminal law framework, particularly the provisions relating to organized criminal groups, combined with a conceptual and functional approach to the phenomenon. At the same time, criminological and sociological considerations are taken into account in order to illustrate the evolutionary trends of organized crime under the impact of new technologies.

Finally, the present study aims not only to identify these transformations, but also to assess their implications for criminal law, particularly with regard to the adequacy of traditional concepts and existing legal instruments in addressing new criminal realities. In this respect, the analysis will highlight the need for an evolutionary interpretation of the applicable legal norms and, potentially, the opportunity for legislative interventions designed to respond effectively to the challenges generated by the use of artificial intelligence within the framework of organized crime.

2. Conceptual Framework

The analysis of the impact of artificial intelligence on organized crime necessarily requires a preliminary clarification of these two concepts.

2.1. Artificial Intelligence

In general terms, artificial intelligence is understood as the set of technologies capable of performing tasks that traditionally required human intelligence, such as learning, reasoning, pattern recognition, or content generation.

Article 3(1) of the European Regulation on Artificial Intelligence - the Artificial Intelligence Act [8] - defines an AI system as "*a machine-based system that is designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy and that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment, and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers from the input it receives how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments*."

For the purposes of the present study, the notion of "*AI resources*" should be understood in a functional sense, encompassing both machine learning and deep learning models, as well as applications derived therefrom, such as generative systems (text, image, voice), automation tools, and predictive analytics solutions.

These technologies allow for a high degree of accessibility, since the development of commercial platforms and access to open-source solutions have effectively democratized access to such resources.

At the same time, AI enables the flexibilization of organizational structures through: the fragmentation of the criminal process into autonomous modules (data collection, attack execution, monetization, money laundering), which may be carried out independently or outsourced; the reduction of dependence on central coordination (through the assumption of functions such as target analysis, optimization of attack timing, or selection of operational strategies); automation and scalability (allowing rapid growth in operational volume without a proportional increase in resources); the continuous adjustment of tactics (depending on victims' reactions, security measures, or achieved outcomes); and transnationality without rigid infrastructure (as it enables coordination among actors located in different jurisdictions without requiring physical presence or traditional logistical structures).

Due to these characteristics, AI makes criminal activities conducted by organized groups more difficult to detect and, consequently, more difficult to combat.

From a criminal law perspective, artificial intelligence currently has no legal personality and cannot constitute the perpetrator of a criminal offense, operating instead as a material means of committing the offense in the classical sense.

2.2. Organized Criminal Group

Under Romanian law, the organized criminal group is regulated by the provisions of Article 367 of the Criminal Code, according to which it represents a structure composed of three or more persons, established for a certain period of time and acting in a coordinated manner for the purpose of committing one or more criminal offenses [1].

This definition broadly reflects the international standards established by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime [9], which, in Article 2(a),

defines an organized criminal group as "*a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit*".

3. AI as a Factor Transforming Organizational Structures

The analysis of the impact of artificial intelligence on organized crime cannot be limited to an empirical description of certain structural changes, but instead requires a deeper theoretical - and even philosophical - approach regarding the manner in which technology reconfigures the very organizational ontology of the criminal group. In this respect, artificial intelligence does not operate merely as an external tool used by the group, but rather as a factor that transforms the internal relationships among its members, the mechanisms of coordination, and, ultimately, the very concept of "organization" in the criminal law sense.

3.1. The Organization of Criminal Groups

The relatively flexible nature of the concept of "structure," used in the definition of an organized criminal group under the relevant legal provisions [Article 2(a) of the Palermo Convention; Article 367 of the Romanian Criminal Code], allows for an extensive interpretation of the term, extending beyond the model of rigid hierarchical organization to include network-based, mixed (hybrid), or even "loosely formalized" organizational configurations.

Accordingly, the term "structure" (of an organized criminal group) may take any of the organizational forms listed above, namely:

a) ***Hierarchy***, characterized by a pyramidal structure with clearly delineated levels of authority and responsibility. Decisions are taken at the central level, while execution is carried out by lower-ranking members. This model is specific to classical forms of organized crime, in which control exercised by the upper echelon of the hierarchy and internal discipline are essential.

b) ***Network***, which implies a flexible form of organization based on horizontal relationships between members or subgroups. Communication and cooperation are not strictly centralized, and the structure allows for rapid adaptation to change.

c) ***Hybrid organization***, which combines elements of the two previous models by integrating a certain degree of central coordination with operational autonomy at the local level. This type of organization reflects contemporary tendencies toward the flexibilization and diversification of criminal structures.

d) ***"Loosely formalized" structures*** (such as ad hoc structures, crime-as-a-service criminal ecosystems, platformized structures such as darknet environments, or latently coordinated structures).

Network-based, hybrid, and "loosely formalized" models are increasingly encountered in modern organized crime, including cybercrime and online fraud, contemporary forms of drug trafficking (online distribution, darknet markets, decentralized delivery systems), money laundering (through the use of cryptocurrencies and financial mules), modern forms of human trafficking and migrant smuggling (organized through route-based networks, where each segment of the route is controlled by a different group), complex economic and financial crime (international tax fraud, "carousel VAT" schemes), as well as crime-as-a-service models.

Therefore, the emergence of digital technologies and, in particular, artificial intelligence, encourages the transition toward organizational models characterized by fluidity, decentralization, and continuous adaptability. This transformation may be interpreted as a shift from a "substantialist" model, in which the group is perceived as a fixed structure, to a "relational" or "processual" model, in which organization is defined through flows of interaction and functionality.

3.2. From Hierarchy to Heterarchy or the Reconfiguration of Authority

Artificial intelligence contributes to the erosion of the classical organizational model - hierarchy - by encouraging the emergence of heterarchical forms of organization, in which authority relationships are diffuse and coordination is achieved primarily through functional mechanisms rather than direct command. Within such a system, AI may

assume roles traditionally attributed to leadership, such as task allocation, decision optimization, or information management.

This transformation carries profound implications, as authority is no longer necessarily personalized, but instead becomes technologically mediated, while the organizational structure itself becomes less rigid and less dependent on specific individuals.

3.3. Organization as a Dynamic Network: The Primacy of Relationships over Structure

From a criminological and sociological perspective, the use of artificial intelligence accelerates the transition toward network-based or "*loosely formalized*" organizational models, in which the unit of analysis is no longer the "group" as a stable entity, but rather the relationships between actors and the functions they perform. Within this framework, organization is no longer defined by formal membership, but by participation in flows of activity.

Artificial intelligence facilitates this transformation by reducing communication and coordination costs, as well as by standardizing processes that previously required direct interaction. As a result, individuals or subgroups may collaborate efficiently without knowing one another or without belonging to a stable structure, leading to the emergence of volatile and adaptive criminal networks.

This dynamic aligns with the observations formulated in Europol reports, which highlight the transformation of criminal groups into flexible structures adapted to the digital environment - a trend amplified by artificial intelligence, which converts organization into a continuous process of configuration and reconfiguration.

3.4. The Democratization of Criminal Capability and the Dilution of Expertise

Another essential aspect of organizational transformation concerns the redistribution of competencies within criminal groups. Under the classical model, technical expertise represented a scarce form of capital concentrated in the hands of specialized members, thereby granting them a strategic role within the organization.

Through the use of artificial intelligence, a significant part of this expertise is externalized to technological systems, becoming accessible to a larger number of participants. This phenomenon may be described as a democratization of criminal capability, insofar as barriers to entry into the group are reduced and dependence on specialists decreases.

The direct consequence is a dilution of competence-based hierarchies, which contributes to the flexibilization of organizational structures. Group members may perform a variety of functions, while roles become increasingly fluid, being determined more by access to resources and operational context than by fixed qualifications.

3.5. Modularization and the Logic of the "Criminal Ecosystem"

One of the most significant effects of the use of artificial intelligence is the tendency toward the fragmentation of criminal activities into distinct components, which may be carried out independently but which together contribute to the achievement of a final result. This modular logic leads to the emergence of a genuine criminal ecosystem, in which different actors provide specialized services interconnected through functional relationships.

The concept of "crime-as-a-service" illustrates this evolution, whereby technological infrastructure, attack tools, or support services are provided for remuneration, without requiring integration into a stable group. Artificial intelligence plays a central role in this process through the standardization and automation of functions, thereby enabling their replication and scalability.

From a philosophical perspective, this transformation may be interpreted as a shift from an "organic" conception of the criminal group, understood as a coherent unit, toward an "ecological" conception, in which organized crime results from the interaction among multiple autonomous entities (a criminal ecosystem). Within this framework, the notion of an organized criminal group becomes increasingly difficult to delimit, being replaced by a network of functional interdependencies.

3.6. Implications for the Legal Concept of Organization

The transformations described above raise fundamental questions regarding the adequacy of the legal concept of the organized criminal group, as regulated by Article 367 of the Romanian Criminal Code and by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, both of which are built upon the premise of the existence of a relatively stable structure characterized by coordination and continuity.

In the context of new technological realities, these criteria become increasingly difficult to apply. For example, coordination may be achieved indirectly through platforms or AI-based tools, while continuity may be replaced by a succession of temporary collaborations. Consequently, a functional reinterpretation of the concept of organization becomes necessary, one that places emphasis on the existence of a common purpose and on the interdependence of activities, rather than on structural formalism.

4. Criminal Law Implications

The transformations generated by the use of artificial intelligence within organized crime do not remain without consequences for the manner in which criminal law conceptualizes, classifies, and sanctions criminal conduct. While, at the factual level, AI contributes to the flexibilization and decentralization of criminal structures, at the legal level significant difficulties arise regarding the legal classification of offenses, the delimitation of criminal participation, and the evidentiary establishment of the constituent elements of criminal offenses. In this context, the issue arises as to whether existing legal instruments are adequate to address new technological realities and whether an evolutionary interpretation of criminal law provisions is required.

4.1. Relevance to the Offense of Establishing an Organized Criminal Group

As previously noted, under Romanian criminal law, the offense of establishing an organized criminal group, regulated by Article 367 of the Criminal Code, presupposes the existence of a structure composed of at least three persons, characterized by a certain degree of durability and coordination for the purpose of committing criminal offenses [1].

In the context of the use of artificial intelligence, however, the question arises whether these criteria can still be adequately applied to forms of organization

characterized by fluidity, fragmentation, and temporary collaborations. Whereas, in classical models, the durability and stability of the structure were relatively easy to identify, in the case of AI-assisted criminal networks these elements may become far less apparent.

For example, ad hoc collaborations between individuals using the same technological resources or participating in the same criminal workflow may generate effects equivalent to those of an organized criminal group, even in the absence of a stable formal structure. The answer can only be affirmative, since, in this context, it becomes necessary to adopt an interpretation that prioritizes the functional criterion of cooperation and the existence of a common criminal purpose over a strictly formalistic understanding of organization.

4.2. Delimitation of the Forms of Criminal Participation

Another essential issue concerns the difficulty of distinguishing between the forms of criminal participation in the context of the use of artificial intelligence. Under classical criminal law, the distinction between perpetrator, co-perpetrator, instigator, and accomplice is based on the concrete contribution of each person to the commission of the offense and on the existence of a subjective link between the participants.

In the case of AI-assisted criminal activities, this distinction becomes more complex for several reasons. First, the use of standardized and widely accessible tools may lead to situations in which multiple participants contribute to the criminal result without direct coordination or mutual acquaintance. Second, the outsourcing of certain functions to platforms or service providers raises questions regarding the legal qualification of such contributions.

For example, the provision of an AI tool capable of being used for illicit purposes does not automatically amount to a form of criminal participation in the absence of intent to contribute to the commission of a specific criminal offense. However, insofar as there is knowledge of the illicit purpose and an effective contribution to the commission of the offense, accomplice liability may be established.

In this context, the analysis must remain grounded in the fundamental principles of criminal law, particularly the requirement of intent and concrete contribution, while avoiding an excessive expansion of criminal liability.

4.3. Artificial Intelligence - Means of Commission or Aggravating Factor?

As previously noted, from the perspective of legal classification, artificial intelligence is, under the current regulatory framework, regarded as a means of committing an offense, insofar as it constitutes a tool used by the perpetrator in carrying out the material element of the crime. This qualification is consistent with the general principles of criminal law, according to which liability rests with the person who uses the respective instrument.

However, the specific characteristics of AI - particularly its capacity for automation, scalability, and adaptability - raise the question whether its use should also be taken into account as an aggravating circumstantial factor, insofar as it increases the social danger posed by the offense. For example, the use of AI to conduct large-scale attacks or to deceive a significant number of victims may justify a more severe assessment of the gravity of the offense.

In the absence of explicit regulations, this issue may be addressed through the general mechanisms governing the individualization of punishment, which allow the court to take into account the specific manner in which the offense was committed and its consequences. Nevertheless, in the long term, the possibility of introducing specific legal provisions cannot be excluded, particularly if the use of AI becomes a constant feature of criminal activities.

4.4. The Problem of Attribution and Causation

The use of artificial intelligence also raises difficulties regarding the establishment of causation and the attribution of the criminal result. In situations where the result is produced through automated or semi-autonomous processes, the question arises as to the extent to which it may be attributed to a specific individual.

In criminal law, attribution presupposes the existence of a link between the person’s conduct and the resulting harm, as well as the possibility of reproaching that result to the individual concerned. In the context of AI use, this connection may be mediated by the

functioning of a technological system, generally of a semi-autonomous nature, which complicates the analysis.

Nevertheless, as long as the use of the AI system is controlled or determined by a person, and the result is reasonably foreseeable, the criminal liability of that person remains unaffected. The issue becomes more complex in situations where the behavior of the system exceeds the parameters anticipated by the user, thereby requiring a nuanced analysis of the form of culpability involved.

5. Evidentiary Challenges

The transformations generated by the use of artificial intelligence within organized crime also produce significant effects on the evidentiary mechanisms specific to criminal proceedings. In this context, the difficulties do not derive exclusively from the technological nature of the means employed, but rather from the interaction between the characteristics of AI - automation, opacity, and scalability - and the emerging features of criminal groups - decentralization, fluidity, and fragmentation.

5.1. Difficulties in Identifying and Individualizing Participants

One of the most evident evidentiary challenges concerns the identification of the members of the criminal group.

The use of digital platforms, encrypted communications, and AI tools for the automation of certain activities allows participants to operate without direct contact with one another and, in some cases, without even knowing each other’s identities. This situation leads to a fragmentation of the criminal chain, in which each actor performs a limited function without having a complete understanding of the overall criminal activity. Consequently, judicial authorities may encounter difficulties in establishing the existence of a link between participants and, implicitly, in proving the organized nature of the activity.

In this regard, reports issued by Europol emphasize that the use of emerging technologies contributes to increased anonymity (among the members of the structure) and reduced traceability of criminal activities, thereby affecting the effectiveness of traditional investigative methods.

5.2. The Problem of Traceability and the Opacity of AI Systems

Another major obstacle concerns the difficulty of ensuring the traceability of the use of AI systems and of understanding the manner in which they contribute to the production of the criminal result. This opacity complicates evidentiary analysis in two essential respects. On the one hand, it becomes difficult to establish the causal link between the use of the AI system and the resulting harm. On the other hand, the issue arises of demonstrating the concrete contribution of each participant, given that operational decisions are partially outsourced to the technological system.

Although the Artificial Intelligence Act introduces requirements regarding the transparency and documentation of the functioning of AI systems, the applicability of such mechanisms in a criminal context remains limited, particularly where non-compliant or modified systems are used.

5.3. The Complexity of Handling Digital Evidence

The use of artificial intelligence also increases the complexity of handling digital evidence. In many situations, the relevant evidence is not concentrated within a single system or jurisdiction, but rather distributed across multiple platforms, servers, and devices, often located in different states.

This dispersion of evidence requires the use of mechanisms of international judicial cooperation, which may prove slow and inefficient in relation to the rapid dynamics of criminal activities. Moreover, the large volume of data generated and processed through AI systems raises issues concerning the selection, preservation, and analysis of relevant information.

In this context, the role of technical expertise becomes essential. Data analysis, the interpretation of outputs generated by AI systems, and the assessment of the manner in which such systems operate require specialized competencies, which may lead to an increased dependence of judicial authorities (such as the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime, the judicial police, the DIICOT, etc.) on expert assistance [10].

Conclusions

The integration of artificial intelligence into the sphere of organized crime does not merely represent a technological evolution of criminal tools, but rather generates a structural transformation in the organization and operation of criminal groups. AI acts as a capability multiplier, increasing the efficiency, scalability, and adaptability of illicit activities, while simultaneously reducing costs and barriers to entry, thereby facilitating the expansion of criminal phenomena.

The profound impact of AI is manifested primarily at the organizational level, through the erosion of traditional hierarchical models and the emergence of flexible, distributed, and modular forms of organization. Criminal groups tend to evolve toward network-based structures or even more fluid configurations based on ad hoc collaborations, the distribution of functions, and decentralized coordination. In this context, the classical notion of the organized criminal group must be understood in a functional manner, as a dynamic set of operational relationships rather than exclusively as a formalized and stable structure.

From a criminal law perspective, these developments generate difficulties relating to legal classification, the delimitation of criminal participation, and the establishment of liability, without, however, requiring a radical reform of the normative framework. The principle of technological neutrality generally allows for the application of existing criminal provisions, although an evolutionary interpretation of concepts such as "*structure*", "*coordination*" and "*durability*" is necessary in order to reflect the reality of contemporary forms of criminal organization.

From a broader perspective, the analysis highlights that artificial intelligence affects not only the methods by which crimes are committed, but also the conceptual paradigm of criminal law concerning organized criminal groups, requiring a transition from a static vision centered on formal and rigid structures toward a dynamic approach focused on processes and functional relationships. The adaptation of the law to these transformations does not require the abandonment of fundamental principles, but rather their reinterpretation in a manner capable of responding to the increasing complexity of criminal phenomena.

In conclusion, artificial intelligence does not dismantle the existing legal framework, but it subjects it to significant evolutionary pressure, the management of which depends on the ability of criminal law to remain flexible, coherent, and adapted to contemporary technological realities.

References:

[1]. Daniel Ene, *Public Security. Offenses against Public Security*, Sitech Publishing House, Craiova, 2026, pp. 184–186;

[2]. George Antoniu and Tudorel Toader (eds.), *Explanations of the New Criminal Code*, Vol. V (Arts. 367–446), Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2016, pp. 24–25;

[3]. The IOCTA (*Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment*) reports prepared by the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) of Europol;

[4]. Europol, *Malicious Uses and Abuses of Artificial Intelligence* (2020), available at: Europol – Malicious Uses and Abuses of Artificial Intelligence;

[5]. Europol, *AI and Policing – The Benefits and Challenges of Artificial Intelligence for Law Enforcement*, available at: Europol – AI and Policing;

[6]. Europol, *EU SOCTA (Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment) 2025 – The Changing DNA of Serious and Organised Crime* (2025), available at: EU SOCTA 2025 Report;

[7]. *The Rise of AI-Enabled Crime*, available at: TRM Labs – The Rise of AI-Enabled Crime;

[8]. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144, and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), published in OJ L 2024/1689 of 12 July 2024;

[9]. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (*Palermo Convention*), ratified by Romania through Law No. 565/2002 for the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in New York on 15 November 2000, published in the Official Gazette No. 813 of 8 November 2002;

[10]. D. Ene, *National Institutions and Regulations concerning the Prevention and Combating of Offenses against Public Security*, Sitech Publishing House, Craiova, 2026.